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Does the mobility of engineers facilitate international knowledge spillovers and help
newly industrializing countries catch up with developed countries?  This study attempts to
answer this question by tracing knowledge flows through the international mobility of
semiconductor engineers.  The paper uses patent data to track the mobility paths of engineers to
examine whether knowledge flows were greater than expected.  The study finds that engineers
who moved from the US to Korea or Taiwan built subsequent innovations based upon the
knowledge of their previous firms in the US.  Case studies based on field interviews suggest
further that these mobile engineers have played significant roles in the technological catch-up of
Korea and Taiwan.  Based on findings from statistical analysis and case studies, this paper makes
policy recommendations for developing countries such as China and India  for catching-up in
high-tech industries.
2INTRODUCTION
Foreign technology has historically played an important role in the industrialization of
Europe, the United States, and Japan.  More recently, newly industrializing countries, such as
South Korea and Taiwan, have also depended upon knowledge developed in industrialized
nations for their economic development (Freeman and Soete, 1997).  Can these countries catch
up with the more advanced nations?  After all, Cantwell (1990) has shown that most industrial
fields remain dominated by a few countries over long periods of time.  An explanation for this
persistence is provided by endogenous growth theory, which suggests that technological catch-up
is difficult because of the increasing returns to scale of physical and human resources and the
geographical localization of technology (Romer, 1990).  The theory suggests that when
knowledge spillovers are geographically concentrated, a country that has a head start in the
accumulation of knowledge tends to increase its productivity lead over time (Grossman and
Helpman, 1991).
Despite such gloomy predictions from the new growth theories, Korea and Taiwan stand
out as examples of countries that have indeed “caught up” and are now leaders in the
semiconductor industry.  Over the past two decades, Korea has leapfrogged from being a mere
producer of discrete devices to being the world leader in the memory (DRAM) industry with a
41% market share in 1998.  Samsung, a leading semiconductor firm in Korea, entered the VLSI
business in 1983 and became the world’s first company to develop a 256M DRAM chip in 1994.
Similarly, Taiwan entered the semiconductor business in the 1970s and now competes
successfully as the world leader in areas such as Mask ROMs and foundry services.  In 1999, in
terms of the total shipment of semiconductors, Korea and Taiwan were ranked as #3 and #4,
respectively, just behind the US and Japan (ERSO, 2000).
In less than 20 years, Taiwan and Korea not only dramatically increased their production
capacities and market shares in the semiconductor industry, but also, more impressively,
improved their R&D capabilities.  In 1983, Korea and Taiwan were granted no semiconductor-
related patents in the US, whereas Germany received 110 patents.  In 1997, 14 years later, Korea
and Taiwan were granted 386 and 267 semiconductor-related patents in the US, respectively,
whereas Germany was granted only 155 such patents (Chang, 1999).  In fact, the total number of
semiconductor-related patents granted to Korea was larger than that of Germany, the UK, and
France combined.  Thanks to this explosive growth in semiconductor-related patents, in 1999,
Samsung Electronics was ranked as the #4 company in terms of the total number of patents
granted in the US in all technology classes.  In the same year, fabless design houses in Taiwan
were rated as #2 in the world, just behind the US, capturing 20% of world market shares
measured in terms of revenues in the chip design area; these design houses also began to produce
a substantial number of patents (ERSO, 2000).
These statistics suggest clearly that Korea and Taiwan caught up with Germany, the UK,
and France in the global semiconductor industry, in terms of both market share and patent
numbers.  In selected areas, the two countries are also threatening the leadership of the US and
Japan.  How did Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor firms acquire and develop technologies
in such a rapid technological catch-up process?  Almeida (1996) shows that part of the answer
can be attributed to the activities of their subsidiaries in the US, which source technology locally.
3There is also evidence to suggest that the inter-country mobility of experts has played a crucial
role.  In its extensive analysis of the “Asian miracle,” the World Bank (1993) emphasizes that the
return of foreign-educated nationals has provided significant transfer of best practices and state-
of-the-art knowledge.  Recent case studies (Cho and Song, 1990; Hou and Gee, 1993; Kim,
1997; Cho, Kim, and Rhee, 1998) also provide anecdotal evidence of the importance of human-
embodied technology transfer in the time-compressed learning processes of Korean and
Taiwanese firms in the semiconductor industry.  Based in part on such anecdotal evidence, the
recent World Development Report on knowledge and economic development (World Bank,
1998) identifies the international movement of people as one of four principal channels for
acquiring imported knowledge (along with trade, foreign direct investment, and technology
licensing).
Human mobility within or across firms has played a very important role in transferring
tacit knowledge or knowledge-building capabilities (Ettl e, 1980; Leonard-Barton, 1995;
Chesbrough, 1999).  In his pioneering work on the sociology of inventions, Gilfilian (1935)
suggested that labor mobility, especially among engineers, erodes the differential level of
knowledge among firms.  However, in spite of voluminous literature on the international transfer
of technology, the impact of inter-firm human mobility on the cross-border knowledge
acquisition and building process has received surprisingly little formal attention or rigorous
analysis (Ettlie, 1985).
In this paper, focusing on the technological catching-up case of Korean and Taiwanese
semiconductor firms, we systematically examine the role of human-embodied technology
transfer across national borders in the acquisition and building of knowledge.  Using patent
citation data, we empirically investigate whether Korean and Taiwanese firms have built upon
the knowledge of US companies by hiring their engineers.  Based on field interviews conducted
in Korea and Taiwan and a review of relevant literature, we further investigate the changing role
of engineer mobility in the rapid technological catching-up process of Korean and Taiwanese
semiconductor firms by studying various modes of technology sourcing.  We conclude the paper
by addressing the implications of government policies to cultivate workers and utilize “reverse
brain drains”, and one of the important consequences of this:  cro s-national networks with
overseas centers of innovative excellence such as Silicon Valley.
4THEORY AND PROPOSITIONS
Nature of Knowledge, Absorptive Capacity, and Learning-by-Hiring
The knowledge needed for innovation may be obtained from a variety of sources.
Although a firm itself is the source of much of the knowledge used in innovation, few firms
possess all the inputs required for successful and continuous technological development.  Firms
must often turn to external sources to fulfill their informational requirements.  In fact, a major
contribution to a firm's knowledge base is likely to come from outside sources.  Allen and Cohen
(1969), in a study of 17 R&D laboratories, found that vendors, “unpaid outside consultants,” and
informal contacts with government bodies and universities are important sources of information
used in research.  In a study of major product and process innovations at Du Pont between 1920
and 1950, Mueller (1966) observed that the original sources of most basic inventions came from
outside the firm.  Suppliers, buyers, universities, consultants, government agencies, and
competitors all serve as sources of vital knowledge and expertise (Jewkes, Sawyers, and
Stillerman, 1958).
For firms or nations which lag others technologically (henceforth termed “followers”),
the challenge for technological catching-up is to acquire and build upon external knowledge that
often resides in foreign countries or in their firms and institutions. The extent to which followers
can acquire external knowledge is determined in part by the nature of knowledge (Zander and
Kogut, 1995) and by the followers’ absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  State-of-
the-art technologies, or the most valuable parts of knowledge, are often tacit (Winter, 1987).  As
we move further into the tacit domain, knowledge becomes increasingly difficult to separate
from those who possess it.  At low levels of codification, knowledge transfer requires rich
mechanisms of communication to facilitate its transfer.  One such mechanism is the transfer of
people (Leonard-Barton, 1995).  Tacit knowledge can be acquired only through experience or
learning-by-doing and thus can be transferred best through training and human transfer.
The tacitness of knowledge often increases its value to the firm possessing it.  A firm that
holds a state-of-the-art technology is often reluctant to voluntarily transfer that technology, given
that it can provide an important source of competitive advantage (since it is hard to imitate).
Additionally, tacit knowledge may be embedded in the firm, making it difficult for other firms to
imitate it or appropriate the rents from it.  Thus, the tacitness of knowledge often leads to
reluctance and inability on the part of technology holders to transfer their knowledge to other
firms (Kogut and Zander, 1996).  Even if technology holders are willing to transfer state-of-the-
art knowledge to followers, the knowledge is often embedded in individuals, thus requiring the
costly transfer of key personnel.
Organizational boundaries serve as knowledge envelopes and valuable knowledge is
much more likely to be diffused within an organization than outside of it (Zucker, Darby,
Brewer, and Peng, 1996).  The sticky nature of tacit knowledge means, of course, that it does not
necessarily flow easily or quickly even within a firm (Szulanski, 1996).  Due to the limited speed
and scope of diffusion across firm boundaries, it is difficult for outsiders to get access to and
master such tacit and complex knowledge.  As shown by Zander and Kogut (1995) and Almeida,
Song, and Grant (1999), multinational firms are superior to alliances or markets as conduits of
knowledge transfer and building, especially when the knowledge is tacit.
5Identifying, acquiring, and assimilating valuable external knowledge, especially tacit
knowledge, requires a firm to possess a considerable level of absorptive capacity (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990).  Cumulative experience with a technology often determines the absorptive
capacity of the recipient in acquiring such tacit knowledge.  Therefore, absorptive capacity varies
considerably according to the prior knowledge base and cumulative investment in learning
capabilities.  Firms seek to acquire knowledge from outside when there is a significant
knowledge gap with industry leaders.  Paradoxically, firms that developed some cumulative
experience and a knowledge base are better positioned to acquire target technologies (Leonard-
Barton, 1995).
Given the tacit nature of knowledge (often embedded in human capital within an
organizational boundary) and the reluctance of “leading” firms to part with this knowledge, how
does a follower gain access to this knowledge for technological catching-up?  Studies have
pointed to the use of alliances in acquiring knowledge (M ry, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996)
and to the advantages of co-location in technology-intensive regions (Alm ida, 1996).  Another
mechanism that permits the acquisition of human-embodied knowledge is the hiring of
experienced engineers who have worked on the relevant technologies in leading firms.
Experienced engineers can improve a “scouting” firm’s related knowledge base or cumulative
experience with a technology and can thus reduce the cost and time of recognizing, accessing,
and assimilating new technologies.  Moreover, the mobility of such highly experienced
technology experts is not simply a one-time transfer of ideas and information, but also facilitates
the transfer of capabilities or know-how permitting further knowledge building (Kim, 1997).   As
suggested by Perez and Soete (1988), a follower’s catching-up process can only be achieved
through acquiring capabilities for participating in the generation and improvement of
technologies, as opposed to the simple use of them.  When an important technology is embedded
in human brains, gaining even one or two key personnel can improve a follower’s knowledge-
building potential (Ettlie, 1985).1  Thus, we propose:
Proposition 1: Follower firms (and countries) can acquire existing knowledge and
build new knowledge necessary for technological catching-up by hiring
experienced engineers who have previously worked for technology leaders in
foreign countries.  
Localized Nature of Knowledge Spillovers and Human-Embodied Technology Transfer
The issues concerning the tacitness of knowledge and human mobility are closely related
to the notion, embedded in endogenous growth theory, of the geographical localization of
knowledge spillovers (.g., Romer, 1986, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991).  Using patent
citation data, J ffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) showed that knowledge spillovers tend to
be geographically localized.  Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) suggested that localized
knowledge spillovers occur due to the immobility of star scientists, or “int llec ual human
capital” tied to a particular location.  Almeida and Kogut (1999) showed that in the
semiconductor industry, knowledge tends to be localized only in certain regions characterized by
high internal mobility and low cross-regional mobility.  Both studies suggest that the lack of
                                                 
1 World Bank (1998) noted that the gap in the capacity to create knowledge is even greater and
more difficult to close than the knowledge gap between developing and developed countries.
6mobility or intra-regional mobility of talented engineers l ads to localized knowledge spillovers.
Moreovr, Zander and Kogut (1995) found that the turnover of key personnel significantly
increases the hazard of involuntary knowledge spillovers in the form of imitation of
technologies.  In a study of the diffusion of semiconductor technology, Tilton (1971) also found
that rapid diffusion occurred when there was high inter-firm mobility of scientists and engineers.
These findings suggest that if there is substantial inter-firm, inter-regional (or perhaps
inter-country) mobility of key personnel, then knowledge can diffuse across borders quickly,
even internationally, and can thus contribute to the technological catch-up of followers which
hire these mobile engineers.  Hence, we propose:
Proposition 2: Human mobility can mitigate the localized nature of knowledge
spillovers and facilitate international knowledge spillovers.
Human Mobility and Knowledge-Building Patterns
We have proposed that the hiring of experienced engineers can improve follower (say
Korea or Taiwan) capabilities in acquiring and building knowledge in the technological catch-up
process.  Hired engineers bring in the cumulative experience of technologies acquired from their
previous companies, which are located in regions or countries that are leaders in the particular
technology.  These engineers not only help absorb externally-sourced technologies, but also
build knowledge by integrating external and internal sources of knowledge.  The path- ependent
nature of learning (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and local search behavior (Stuart and Podolny,
1996) suggest that hired engineers would be more likely to improve the knowledge base or
knowledge-building capabilities of their new employers based upon knowledge mastered at their
previous companies.
Through collaborative research, social interaction, and mentoring, engineers may
influence the research directions of fellow researchers in the hiring company.  As mentioned
previously, knowledge building activities by newl hired engineers a e based on their prior
knowledge and are manifestations f local search from the perspective of these engineers.
However, from the perspective of the hiring company, knowledge building based on hired
engineers’ previous knowledge is not necessarily local search, but may instead represent the
exploration of distant (and leading) knowledge from external sources.  Followers tend to hire
experienced engineers when they intend to develop technologies in new areas of technological
innovation (Ettlie, 1985).  Hired engineers could emerge as central actors in the networks of
social interaction and act as leaders in research.  Ba d on prior experience, knowledge, and
social networks, hired engineers could serve as technological gatekeepers and boundary spanners
who influence the source, flow, and direction of knowledge for subsequent knowledge-building
activities.  Hence, for engineers moving from the US (a leader) to Korea and Taiwan (followers),
we offer the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Inventors, after moving to Korea or Taiwan, are likely to build
upon the knowledge base of the firm of their previous employment in the US.
7Hypothesis 2: Inventors, after moving to Korea or Taiwan, are likely to build
upon the knowledge base of the region of their previous employment in the US.
Building new knowledge based on prior knowledge bases developed by hired engineers
in overseas companies also indicates that international knowledge spillovers have taken place
through human mobility.  Thus, examining these knowledge-building hypotheses empirically
provides a first step towards seeking the answer to the rapid technological catching-up puzzle of
Korea and Taiwan.   
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Samples and Patent Citations
We use patent citation data to trace the knowledge building patterns of followers from
Korea and Taiwan by scouting experienced engineers from the US in the semiconductor
industry. The semiconductor industry is a particularly appropriate arena within which to study
international technology development and the role of mobility, since it is the apotheosis of a
knowledge-based industry.  The industry has remained at the leading edge of scientific
discovery, pushing continually at the limits of the physical sciences – not just in electronics, but
also in quantum physics, electromagmetics, optics, lasers, metallurgy and materials sciences,
chemistry, and lithography.
To identify mobile engineers who (1) are capable enough to file multiple patents in the
US and (2) have moved from the US to Korea or Taiwan, we first constructed a record of the
career paths of semiconductor engineers with patenting records from a longitudinal patent and
patent citation database.  Specifically, we identified engineers who initially filed patents for US
semiconductor firms and then later filed patents for Korean or Taiwanese firms.  To id ntify
engineers who moved across borders, we listed the names of every engineer named on a
semiconductor patent in Korea or Taiwan between 1975 and 1995.  We then ran a match for
these names with the inventors of every semiconductor patent invented in the US.  We found 78
probable matches (last name, first name, middle initial) for inventors who had patented first in
the US and then subsequently in Korea or Taiwan.  We then examined each of the patenting
records carefully to filter out false matches or problematic cases.2  To me ure the inter-country
knowledge influences brought about by the mobility of semiconductor engineers, we developed a
patent database of the career paths of the final sample of 28 engineers. The 28 engineers filed a
total of 82 patents after moving to Korea or Taiwan and 72 patents before moving.  While some
information on mobility s undoubtedly missed, the data permit interesting analysis.
The patent document has extensive information that is useful to the study of innovation
and innovative influences.  A patent document provides data on the geographic location and the
technology of an innovation.  In addition, patent citations permit us to infer the scientific and
                                                 
2 The process of determining a real cross-country move from a false one is subjective. If the area
of patenting differed dramatically across time, or if the engineer’s career path remained unclear,
we did not include the inventor in the final sample.  Also, if the names were very common or if
there was evidence suggesting that multiple inventors were patenting using the same name, we
did not include these names.
8technological influences on a particular invention.  A list of citations for each patent is made
through a uniform and rigorous process applied by the patent examiner as a representative of the
patent office.  The patent applicant is obliged by law to specify in the application any and all of
the “prior art” that the applicant is aware of.  The list of patent citations so compiled is available
on the patent document, along with information on the inventor, his or her geographic location,
the inventor’s company (the “assignee”), and technology types.
To investigate the knowledge-building hypotheses, we examine whether mobile
engineers who moved from the US to Korea or Taiwan a e subsequently more likely than
expected to cite patents from (1) the firm or university of their original employment in the US,
and (2) the state or region of their original employment in the US.
Methods
We conduct T-tests based on the case-control methodology used by Jaffe,Trajtenberg,
and Henderson (1993) and Almeida (1996).  The patent citation analysis is carried out using the
case-control method by focusing on (1) the patents (henceforth “original patents”) filed by the
mobile engineers for their original firms in the US and (2) the citations by their patents
subsequent to their moves to firms in Korea and Taiwan.  In order to evaluate the hypothesis that
knowledge is transferred across countries through the mobility of engineers, this case-control
study investigates the extent to which the patents cited after the cross-country move, which
represent knowledge spillovers from previous innovations (cases), and comparable (along
technical and temporal lines) patents which are not cited (controls), differ with respect to their
location (region) and firm (owner).  We expect to find that the cited patents are more likely to
belong to the prior company (or region) of employment of the engineer than the control patents.
First, every “original patent” (or the patents filed by the engineer before moving from the
US) is listed.  Next, the patents filed by the engineer after the move to Korea or Taiwan are listed
(“new patents”) and every patent cited by these “new patents” is identified.  Thus, we have a list
of “original patents” and a list of “cited patents.”  After this, the geographic location, the patent
owner (usually a firm), and other temporal and technological details relating to the original and
cited patents are compiled.  We are interested in the extent to which the cited patents match the
original patents.  To adjust for any bias due to the existing distribution of technological activity,
we follow Jaffe et al. (1993) in the construction of a “control sample.”  For each cited patent, we
identify a corresponding control patent.  This patent is identified such that the patent
(technology) class is identical to that of the cited patent and the application date is as near as
possible to that of the cited patent.  This control patent thus resembles the cited patent in terms of
technology and time of innovation.  Since the control patent, however, is not cited by the new
patent, the frequency of a match between the original patent and the control patent in terms of
assignee organization or region reflects the existing concentration of patenting activity.  The
frequency of matches between the original patent and the control patent sets a baseline frequency
against which we compare the frequency of original patent-cited patent matches.
Let us illustrate the design of the statistical test.  Let Pcit  be th  frequency probability that
the assignee (or region) of the cited patent matches the assignee (or region) of the original patent
for the particular engineer.  Let Pcon  be the corresponding frequency probability that the control
9patent belongs to the same assignee as the original patent for the particular engineer. Assuming
binomial distributions, the null hypothesis is:
Ho:  Pcit = Pcon
and the alternate hypothesis is:
Ha:  Pcit > Pcon
The t-statistic is calculated as follows:
t   =  (Pcit-Pcon)/[(Pcit(1-Pcit)+Pcon(1-Pcon))/n]
0.5
The 't' statistic tests the difference between two independently drawn binomial
proportions.  A positive significant value of Student's t indicates support of the proposition that
mobility influences knowledge flows.  The tests were carried out at the regional level as well.
Statistical Results
The main results of the case-control tests for both samples are given in Table 1.  The
“number of citations” corresponds to the total number of citations – 572 by the 82 “new” patents.
“A” and “B” are the percentages of citations and controls, respectively, that belong to the same
firm, state, or country as the corresponding original patent.  The t-statistic tests the equality of
the control and citing proportions, as described previously.
It can be seen that we have only partial support for the hypotheses.
Our main hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), testing the transfer of firm-level knowledge through
the mobility of engineers, is strongly supported.  After moving to Korea and Taiwan, engineers
continue to build on the knowledge of their previous firms in the US.  The findings for
Hypothesis 2, testing the effects of mobility on the transfer of regional knowledge, are also
positive but are not significant.  Engineers, once they move across countries, do cite previous
patents from firms located in the region they once worked.  However, this regional effect is not
strong enough to generate significant results.
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CASE STUDIES
The above statistical analysis shows that engineers who moved from the US to Korea or
Taiwan tended to build subsequent knowledge in recruiting companies based on prior knowledge
that they mastered in the US.  This finding suggests that mobile engineers facilitated
international knowledge spillovers and represented an important basis for technological catching-
up.  To further illuminate the role of these mobile engineers in the technological catch-up process
of Korea and Taiwan, we conducted a series of field interviews in the two countries in 1999 and
2000, as well as an extensive literature review.  Because rapid technological catching-up took
place as a mix of various modes of technology sourcing, including scouting experienced
engineers abroad, the case studies below cover the evolution of modes of technology sourcing in
general, with a special emphasis on learning-by-hiring through the mobility of engineers.
Technological Catch-Up Case of Korea
Korean semiconductor firms have achieved one of the most remarkable technology catch-
up cases in the post-war era. In the case of Korea,  its big business groups known as chaebol,
played crucial roles in the rapid growth of the semiconductor industry.  During 1983 and 1984,
the largest chaebol in Korea – Samsung, Hyundai, and – made massive investments in
semiconductors under Samsung’s initiative. Initially, Samsung’s late chairman Byu g-Chull Lee
scouted Dr. Im-Sung Lee, who had worked for GE, IBM, and Sharp, as a technical advisor.
With the help of Dr. Lee, Samsung scouted four more highly experienced Korean semiconductor
engineers from the US.  These engineers played important roles in laying out Samsung’s
technology acquisition strategies in the early years.
Since their entry into the DRAM business, Korean semiconductor firms have used
multiple modes of technology acquisition – technology licensing, internal development,
technology-seeking foreign direct investment, and “scouting” for experienced engineers –
simultaneously.  Initially, technology licensing played an important role in acquiring key
technologies.  Between 1983 and 1988, Korean semiconductor firms entered 101 technology
licensing agreements – 66 cases of these were with US firms.
Foreign semiconductor equipment makers also helped Korean firms to learn
manufacturing technologies quickly.  Samsung was the first DRAM company in the world to
adopt the 6-inch and then the 8-inch wafer fabrication equipment.  As the first adopter, Samsung
was able to get full technical support from equipment makers who had strong incentives to
provide evidence of the yield-enhancing capabilities of their new equipment.  Hyundai and LG
soon followed suit.  As a result, Korean firms mastered advanced manufacturing technologies
and improved yields rapidly.
A notable factor in the technological progress of the three major Korean semiconductor
firms is that, instead of relying exclusively on imported technology through licensing, all three
major players improved their abilities (and absorptive capacity) rapidly by investing heavily in
internal R&D activities from the beginning.  Recognizing the lack of a prior knowledge base in
the DRAM business, Samsung and Hyundai set up R&D labs in Silicon Valley in 1983, at the
same time as their entrance into the DRAM business.  Using these overseas R&D labs, they
scouted Korean engineers who worked for US companies.
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These ethnic Korean engineers in the US who were scouted by Korean firms played
crucial roles in the technological catching-up process.  Since 1965, the most talented Korean
engineering students have begun moving to the US to earn advanced graduate degrees. Because
there was little opportunity for them to utilize their advanced skills in Korea, a majority of them
stayed and worked for US companies.  As Korean chaebol with deep pockets began to enter
technology-intensive industries such as the semiconductor industry in the 1980s, they recruited
these experienced engineers and managers who resided in the US. An important objective of
setting up R&D labs in Silicon Valley was to harness these ethnic Korean engineers, as well as
non-Korean engineers, who wanted to stay in Silicon Valley.
In the initial stages of technology development, the R&D labs in Silicon Valley made
attempts not only to absorb and assimilate licensed technologies for mass production in Korea,
but also to build new knowledge.   For example, SSI, Samsung’s R&D lab in Silicon Valley,
played a key role in assimilating 64K DRAM designs and production processes just 6 months
after Samsung’s announced entry in 1983 into the DRAM business.  For R&D activities in SSI,
Samsung hired highly experienced Korean design and process engineers from IBM, Zilog,
National Semiconductor, Intel, and Intersil.  Along with other Korean and American engineers,
including several designers who moved from Mostek, these experienced Korean engineers led
the development of designs and processes for 256K DRAM.  These local engineers, many of
them ethnic Koreans, in overseas R&D labs brought in tacit knowledge that the Korean firms
initially lacked.  In addition, these overseas R&D labs served as training grounds for Korean
engineers who were educated and trained in Korea.  They also served as information scanning
outposts to acquire the latest technical information, as well as to monitor and identify important
new technological trends that were taking place in Silicon Valley or the US.
Korean semiconductor firms also improved their own internal R&D capabilities in Korea.
Samsung invested 12.6% of its sales in R&D activities in 1987, employing 966 researchers,
including 20 with (mostly American) Ph.D. degrees.  In the same year, Samsung spent about 4%
of its sales for royalty payments.  Initially, the bulk of R&D activity took place in the US and all
manufacturing activity took place in Korea. Experienced engineers, hired from US companies,
secured key posts in R&D labs and plants in Korea as well.  Starting from the development of
1M DRAM, R&D labs in Korea began to play increasingly important roles.  As a result, the
importance of both Silicon Valley labs and technology licensing as modes of technology
acquisition has decreased rapidly in the 1990s.
Engineers, hired from the US, continued to play key roles in the subsequent knowledge
building process. According to an internal company document from Sa sung, among 36
development team leaders as of 1989, fourteen senior engineers (39%) had work experience
overseas.  Twelve of them both earned graduate degrees (ten Ph.D.s) in he US and worked for
US companies before they joined Samsung.  An additional fourteen out of 36 team leaders (39%)
earned graduate degrees – twelve of them Ph.D. degrees – from major US research universities,
although they did not have work experience in US companies.  Only eight team leaders (22%) –
six of them with Ph.D. degrees – did not study or work abroad.  Among 36 team leaders, nine
senior engineers worked in SSI, Silicon Valley.  Eight of the nine senior engineers at SSI had
research experience in US companies after they earned advanced degrees in the US.  These
figures show the dominance of “returned brains” who were educated and/or worked in the US in
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the early history of Samsung’s technology development. Over time, as Samsung has emerged as
a world leader in DRAM technology, the ratio of “returned brains” in key technical posts has
decreased and locally educated and trained engineers have played increasingly important roles.
This anecdotal evidence illustrates the importance of human-embodied technology
transfer in the time-compressed learning process of the Korean semiconductor industry.  Based
on their prior experience and knowledge bases, the key engineers who occupied major posts in
domestic and overseas R&D labs and corporate headquarters steered the direction of technology
acquisition and development strategies and offered time and cost-saving advice and solutions
when these companies faced technological bottlenecks.  These engineers and their valuable tacit
knowledge helped Korean semiconductor firms overcome the initial lack of expertise and
absorptive capacity in a short time.  Furthermore, the movement of these engineers to Korean
firms brought not only advanced external knowledge, but also capabilities to build improved
knowledge based on the combination of internally accumulated and externally acquired
knowledge.
Technological Catch-Up Case of Taiwan
Taiwan has followed somewhat different evolutionary paths in its development of the
semiconductor industry.  Whereas chaebolplayed a pivotal role in Korea, the Taiwanese
government took initiatives in the emergence of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry.  While
Korea focused mainly on DRAMs, Taiwan developed its strengths in foundry services, Mask
ROMs, and application-specific IC (ASIC) chips.  While chaebol pursued vertical integration
from the design to the testing of chips, the Taiwanese semiconductor industry developed a
network of specialized firms.  Another difference was that government-sponsored research
institutions played much more important and direct roles in absorbing foreign technologies and
developing R&D capabilities in the case of Taiwan, whereas in Korea, private firms played key
roles.
Despite these differences, there exist substantial similarities between the technology
sourcing strategies of Taiwan and Korea.  Both countries used multiple modes of technology
sourcing and have changed the relative importance of each mode over time.  As was the case in
Korea, ethnic Taiwanese or Chinese engineers in the US played pivotal roles in transferring
technical know-how and, more importantly, knowledge-building capabilities.  Taiwan relied
heavily on technology licensing, but like Korea, Taiwan has invested aggressively in developing
its own R&D capabilities.  Similar to the Korean case, alliances or joint ventures with foreign
firms became more widely used over time.
Let us illustrate the history of the catching-up process of the Taiwanese semiconductor
industry with a special focus on the role of returned brains from the US.  The origin of the
Taiwanese semiconductor industry goes back to 1973, with the initiatives of Dr. Yun-Hsuan Sun,
Minister of Economic Affairs.  Dr. Sun, a former electrical engineer, established the Industrial
Technology Research Institute (ITRI), a leading government research institution, in 1973.  He
then set up the Electronics Research & Service Organization (ERSO) under ITRI in 1974.
ITRI/ERSO played a pivotal role in identifying, acquiring, absorbing, developing, and
disseminating semiconductor-related technologies in Taiwan (Aoyama, 1999; Chang, 1999;
Mathews and Cho, 2000).  To lay out a long-term development plan for the semiconductor
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industry in Taiwan, Dr. Sun also set up the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) in 1974.  Dr.
Wenyuan Pan, a Chinese-American ngineer who headed the R&D efforts of RCA, organized
TAC with a group of experienced ethnic Chinese semiconductor engineers in the US.  The active
consultation efforts of TAC to the government suggest that, from the inception of the
semiconductor industry, ethnic Chinese engineers in the US played an important role.
The government also established H inchu Science-Based Industrial Park (HSIP) in 1980
and provided various incentives to attract high-tech firms, including start-up firms.  HSIP was
located near ITRI/ERSO and two major research universities in Taiwan.  An important goal of
HSIP was to lure ethnic Taiwanese engineers, many of them graduates of the two universities in
Hsinchu, from the US back to Taiwan.  To achieve this goal, HSIP made substantial investments
towards making living and educational conditions in the park comparable to those in the US.
HSIP introduced the first bilingual education programs in Taiwan to some schools in the park, so
that the children of returnees from the US could adjust smoothly.  In addition, the HSIP
administration, as well as ITRI, opened branch offices in Silicon Valley.  A primary role of these
branch offices was to persuade Taiwanese engineers to return home by providing information
and local contacts (Saxenian, 1999).  The branch offices also developed databases of Taiwanese
engineers in the US and shared them with Taiwanese firms.
As was the case in Korea, technology licensing played an important role in Taiwanese
efforts to acquire advanced technologies.  In the case of Taiwan, ITRI/ERSO often licensed
technologies on behalf of private firms, absorbed these technologies, and then disseminated them
to the private sector.  Once imported technology was absorbed successfully, ERSO often spun
off the project. ERSO provided staff, equipment, and technology to spin-off firms that became
leading semiconductor firms in Taiwan such as United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC),
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and Vanguard.
From the early developmental stage of the industry, besides licensing technologies,
Taiwanese semiconductor firms and ITRI/ERSO invested actively in developing their own R&D
capabilities.  In addition to domestic R&D investments, most leading companies also set up
R&D labs in Silicon Valley.  In terms of the development of indigenous technological
capabilities, a unique characteristic of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry is the proliferation
of fabless design houses.  As of April 2000, there are 127 design houses in Taiwan.  In 1999, the
total revenue of these fabless design houses reached US $2.3 billion.  Taiwan captured 19.6% of
the world market share of fabless chip design segments, just behind the US. Most fabless design
houses were founded by ex-researchers of ERSO or returned engineers from the US.
Similar to the case of Korea, returned engineers from the US played pivotal roles in
Taiwanese efforts to absorb foreign technologies and develop their own knowledge-building
capabilities.  The number of returned brains has increased rapidly since the late 1980s.  In HSIP,
over 3000 returned engineers worked in private companies (HSIP, 1998).  By 1998, more than
30% of Taiwanese engineers who studied in the US returned home, compared to only10% in the
1980s (Saxenian, 1999).
From the 1960s through the 1980s, as was also the case in Korea, many elite engineering
students in Taiwan went to the US to earn advanced degrees and then stayed because there was
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little chance for them to utilize their advanced knowledge back home.  In the 1980s, according to
National Science Council statistics, Taiwanese students topped the rankings of the total number
of foreign-born engineering students at the graduate level.   Since the late 1980s, as Taiwan
aggressively invested in the semiconductor industry, and as income levels, living and political
environments improved substantially, a significant number of these engineers began to return
home.  Government incentive schemes for entrepreneurial activities and the rapid development
of venture capital infrastructures also encouraged talented Taiwanese engineers in Silicon Valley
to start their own businesses in Taiwan.  In addition to the improvement in Taiwan’s domestic
conditions, glass ceilings that Taiwanese engineers encountered in many US firms also
facilitated their return back home, where they could be promoted to the top or play more
influential roles.  Also, Taiwanese engineers who were not native English speakers often faced
personal and professional isolation in Silicon Valley, which at the time was dominated by white
men (Saxenian, 1999).
Many returned engineers started their new careers at ITRI/ERSO or at private firms in
Taiwan.  Many key researchers at ITRI/ERSO had earned their degrees and then worked
overseas. Among researchers who joined ITRI/ERSO between 1994 and 1999, 442 earned
doctoral degrees abroad and 480 earned master’s degrees overseas.  Many returnees who initially
joined ITRI/ERSO became founding members of spin-off ventures, started their own design
houses, or were scouted by private-sector semiconductor firms.  For example, TSMC was
established in 1987 by the initiative of Morris Chang, who had served as the president of ITRI.
Morris Chang had been a senior vice president at Texas Instruments in charge of semiconductor
production and also served as president of General Instruments, before joining ITRI.
Recently, more returnees have begun to found their own firms.  As of 1998, 109
companies out of 222 Taiwanese companies in HSIP were founded by returned brains from the
US. These returned engineers have maintained their personal and professional relations with
friends and colleagues, many of them ethnic Chinese, in the US.  Feelings of personal and
professional isolation in the US encouraged Taiwanese engineers in Silicon Valley to develop
strong personal and professional bonds among themselves.  Many of them had already known
each other because they were mostly graduates from several elite universities in Taiwan.  These
social communities further evolved into professional associations such as the Chinese Institute of
Engineers (CIE), which was established in 1979.  Even after some of these engineers returned to
Taiwan, they often maintained their social networks with Taiwanese engineers in the US, and
thus, returnees served as gatekeepers linking Taiwanese firms to Silicon Valley firms.  Returnees
often exchanged technical information with and sought technical advice from their friends and
former colleagues in the US.  CIE, by providing an important source of information, training,
legal, and financial help, also played an important role in fostering the entrepreneurial activities
of Taiwanese engineers in Silicon Valley (Aoyama, 1999; S xenian, 1999).
The effort to develop a close linkage between Silicon Valley and Taiwan culminated in
the establishment of Monte Jade Science and Technology Association.  The primary goal of the
association was to bring together Taiwanese engineers in Silicon Valley and Taiwan to promote
business cooperation, investment, and technology transfer between executives and companies in
Taiwan and Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1999).  The association has conducted various activities
linking people in both regions and has thus, served as an important mechanism for returned
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engineers to maintain their personal and social links to ethnic Taiwanese engineers in Silicon
Valley.
CONCLUSIONS
Through patent citation analysis and in-depth case studies based primarily on field
interviews, we found support for the role of the cross-country mobility of experts in transferring
knowledge from the US to Korea and Taiwan in the rapid technological catching-up process of
both countries in the semiconductor industry.  The case-control study suggests that
semiconductor engineers who move from US universities and firms carry with them firm-
specific knowledge and are able to build upon this knowledge within their new firms in follower
countries.  The study also indicates that this knowledge flow across borders has a “local”
character to it – engineers are able to carry firm-embodied knowledge, but are less able to
transfer knowledge embodied in regions.
The case studies in this paper further illuminate the importance of the mobility of
engineers in the technological catching-up process of followers.  Returned brains from the US,
which is the center of innovation in the semiconductor ndustry, enhanced absorptive capacity
and the knowledge-building capabilities of followers in Taiwan and Korea in a time-compressed
fashion.  These returnees helped semiconductor firms in Taiwan and Korea, which were
latecomers, to identify and acquire the appropriate technologies that leaders in the US had
already developed.  Thus, these firms were able to reduce the time and cost of acquiring
advanced technologies significantly, with less trial-and-error experimentation.  The significant
contribution of returned brains was made possible by aggressive investments by both Taiwan and
Korea in building their own in-house R&D capabilities from the very early stages, when they
still licensed almost all technologies.  Returned brains also played important roles in training
local engineers and recently, these locally trained engineers began to produce a substantial
number of US patents.
 The crucial role of mobile engineers as carriers of important tacit knowledge is not
unique to the case of Taiwan and Korea.  Human mobility across firms has played a very
important role in transferring tacit knowledge or knowledge-building capabilities in the domestic
context as well (Ettlie, 1980; Leonard-Barton, 1995).  This phenomenon was especially
conspicuous in the US, and is “almost legendary in places like Silicon Valley (Chesbrough,
1999: 461).  By scouting key engineers from incumbent technology leaders, rival firms or start-
up firms accessed technically advanced firms’ extensive know-how and knowledge-building
capabilities at a fraction of the cost and time of creating them in-house.  In the international
context, mobile engineers from the US also played important roles in the emergence of high-tech
industries in Israel and Ireland (S xenian, 1999).
Among countries that witnessed their best and brightest students move to the US, China
and India have not yet benefited much from “reverse brain drains.”  Given the huge number of
ethnic Chinese and Indian engineers working in high-tech firms in the US, there is a good
possibility for us to witness reverse brain drains from the US to India and China in the near
future.
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The successful technological catching-up experience of Taiwan and Korea, partly based
on the effective utilization of returned engineers from the US, offers some policy implications
for other developing countries such as China and India, which are trying to develop their own
high-tech industries.  Both Taiwan and Korea were concerned about brain drains initially
because a majority of their elite engineering students moved to the US and did not return home
(Hou and Gee, 1993).  However, the brain drain in the 1960s and 1970s turned out to be a
blessing and formed a basis for the reverse brain drain in subsequent periods when both countries
began investing heavily in high-tech sectors in the 1980s.
However, as we saw in the case of both Taiwan and Korea, attracting experienced
engineers back home does not take place automatically.  The governments and private firms tried
their best to encourage experienced engineers overseas to return home.  These engineers
considered returning home only after they found that there were good opportunities for them to
utilize their advanced skills at home and that their skills would be compensated adequately.  As
seen in both cases, rising income levels and improvements in living and educational
environments were important prerequisites for facilitating the reverse brain drain.  In addition,
setting up R&D labs in the US turned out to be an effective way for companies in both countries
to hire talented ethnic Korean and Taiwanese engineers who did not want to return to their home
countries due to personal or professional reasons.  As the World Bank also emphasized in their
recent reports (1993; 1999), we suggest that returned brains from developed countries can offer a
short cut for developing countries to acquire state-of-the-art knowledge and develop subsequent
knowledge-building capabilities in the process of technological catching-up.
 This study has further implications for research in international technology transfer, new
growth theory, and developmental economics.  First, by focusing on the mobility of engineers
and subsequent knowledge building, this study examined the linkage between human mobility
and inter-firm knowledge transfer.  As Ettlie (1985) lamented, few pr vious tudies have
investigated mpirically the impact of human mobility on the innovation process at the
organizational level, mainly due to data constraints.  Our database on cross-border engineer
mobility and patent citations enabled us, to some extent, to fill the empirical void regarding this
important topic.  Second, this study highlighted the importance of human-embodied technology
transfer, which has been relatively neglected by existing studies of international technology
transfer.  We suggest that learning-by-hiring offers a mechanism to overcome obstacles and
harness the advantages presented by technically- and organizationally-bound technologies.
Finally, by focusing on the role of returned human capital in the “catching-up” of Korean and
Taiwanese semiconductor firms, this study attempted to offer an added insight into the leader-
follower debate between neo-classical theory and endogenous growth theory.  Also, by showing
that inter-firm human mobility across national borders can mitigate the localized nature of
knowledge spillovers and accelerate international R&D spillovers, the study provided additional
evidence of the role of human mobility in the spatial patterns of knowledge spillovers.  
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Table 1
Results from Case Control T-Test
REGION FIRM
 NUMBER OF PATENT CITATIONS 572 572
  A = PATENT CITATION MATCHING % 19.76 8.39
  B = PATENT CONTROL MATCHING % 17.13 3.49
  A/B 1.15 2.4
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